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Abstract 
What words we use, and what meanings they have, is important. We shouldn't use slurs; we should use                                   
'rape' to include spousal rape (for centuries we didn’t); we should have a word which picks out the                                   
sexual harassment suffered by people in the workplace and elsewhere (for centuries we didn’t).                           
Sometimes we need to change the word-meaning pairs in circulation, either by getting rid of the pair                                 
completely (slurs), changing the meaning (as we did with 'rape'), or adding brand new word-meaning                             
pairs (as with 'sexual harassment'). 
A problem, though, is how to do this. One might worry that any attempt to change language in                                   
this way will lead to widespread miscommunication and confusion. I argue that this is indeed so, but                                 
that's a feature, not a bug of attempting to change word-meaning pairs. The miscommunications and                             
confusion such changes cause can lead us, via a process I call ​transformative communicative                           
disruption​, to reflect on our language and its use, and this can be further, rather than hinder, our goal                                     
of improving language. 
 
Introduction 
 
Sometimes having certain word-meaning pairs in circulation in a population of speakers at a particular                             
time, in a particular social-historical milieu, can be bad. Such word-meaning pairs might cause                           
injustice or disadvantage, stifle discourse, deliberation and inquiry, or stall social progress. It’s not                           
hard to think of examples – take any slur. The population would be better off without such                                 
word-meaning pairs.  
 
Likewise, sometimes ​not having certain word-meaning pairs in circulation in a population of speakers                           
at a particular time, in a particular social-historical milieu, can be bad. ​Not having these word-meaning                               
pairs can cause injustice or disadvantage, stifle discourse, deliberation and inquiry, or stall social                           
progress. Two prominent examples are discussed by Miranda Fricker (2007) in relation to the notion                             
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of hermeneutical injustice: ​sexual assault and ​postpartum depression​. The population is better off with                           
such word-meaning pairs.   
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Still further, sometimes certain word-meaning pairs in circulation in a population of speakers at a               
particular time, in a particular social-historical milieu, could be better. Consider, for example, the              
recent revision of the meaning of ​marriage to include same-sex couples: Here the word was kept but                 
the meaning improved. In this way, sometimes changes in meaning for existing words can bring about                
various favorable effects or prevent various unfavorable ones. 
 
I take it, then, that it matters what word-meaning pairs are in circulation for a given linguistic                                 
population; that which language we speak can have a significant impact on whether or not the world is                                   
as it should be (for example, if our language lacks the word-meaning pair of our 'postpartum                               
2
depression', then the world, at least as far as it concerns the treatment of new mothers, isn't as it should                                       
be because their sufferings might go unrecognised); and hence, that normative claims about                         
word-meaning pairs are important to reflect on. 
 
It is clear, then, that speakers sometimes have good reasons to and should have a strong interest in                                   
eliminating existing word-meaning pairs from circulation, ​introducing ​new word-meaning pairs into                     
circulation, or, indeed, introducing and eliminating word-meaning pairs in tandem – that is, what has                             
been variously called ​changing​, ​shifting, engineering, ​replacing​, ​revising, improving, innovating or                     
ameliorating​. Whether or not they should always act on those reasons or interests, and what they                               
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should do to act on those reasons or interests, are different and more difficult questions to answer.  
 
In this paper, I attempt to characterize one potentially controversial, though sometimes justified, means                           
by which to act on those reasons and interests. I provide a descriptive account of a kind of linguistic                                     
strategy speakers of a language can, and sometimes do, engage in to bring about changes to the                                 
word-meaning pairs in circulation (Sections 1, 2, 5 and 6). I outline what it is I take to be controversial                                       
about this strategy – that is, the kind of moral and linguistic challenges there are to justifying the                                   
1 Note that Fricker wouldn't quite frame it this way: she would speak of people being better off with such 
hermeneutical resources​, but the point is essentially the same. On the topic of terminology: throughout I speak 
of word-meaning pairs where others might use  talk of concepts or intensions and extensions. There isn't any 
particularly deep reason for my doing so, but it helps me formulate some of my claims more neatly. 
2 I don’t mean to commit myself, in this paper, to a particular normative theory or meta-ethical stance. I take it 
that the contents of this paper can be suitably rephrased without loss of the central observations and claims 
therein, if one does want to commit to some theory or stance. 
3 These notions are inspired by the work of various authors: Haslanger (2012), Scharp (2013), Eklund (2015, 
2017), Plunkett and Sundell (2013, forthcoming), Burgess and Plunkett (2013a, 2013b), Cappelen (2018), 
Richard (2014). It should be clear, however, that my understanding is narrower and should not be confused with 
the different views of these authors. 
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strategy (Sections 3 and 4). Finally, I argue that there is a way around these challenges by way of a                                       
linguistic phenomenon I call ​transformative communicative disruption​ (Section 5).  
 
Section 1: Meaning Change, Linguistic Intervention and 
Linguistic Transgression 
 
Linguistic Interventions  
 
Before we can understand whether or not speakers should act on their reasons or interests in changing                                 
the word-meaning pairs in circulation, it would first be useful to understand from a semantic,                             
pragmatic and metasemantic perspective what it is speakers are doing when they intentionally and                           
strategically try to eliminate, introduce or change the word-meaning pairs in circulation, and what                           
kinds of effects these doings can have. Call communicative activities on the part of a speaker that                                 
(intentionally and strategically) attempt to change the word-meaning pairs in circulation, ​linguistic                       
interventions​.  
 
I take it that having a proper semantic, pragmatic and metasemantic account of linguistic interventions                             
is of independent theoretical interest, because regardless of whether speakers should act on their                           
interests in changing word-meaning circulation, it is clear that speakers often do engage in                           
communicative activities that aim to introduce and/or eliminate word-meaning pairs from circulation.                       
Several recent prominent examples include: ​marriage, rape, sexual assault, organic, terrorist,                     
migrant, fake news​, as well as pronoun introduction and use. Such cases may plausibly be construed as                                 
largely driven by grass-roots, bottom-up linguistic intervention, but there are numerous examples of                         
top-down attempts at institutional intervention as well: where institutions attempt to change the                         
word-meaning pairs in circulation via legislation, authority or influence (think, to use an example                           
George Lakoff made famous, of the Republican Party's mostly successful attempt to replace 'tax cut'                             
with 'tax relief'). I will be principally concerned with processes that are primarily bottom-up, though of                               
course both are important and interesting forms of linguistic intervention.  
 
I take it that the processes of meaning change in cases of linguistic intervention are different from                                 
standard processes of meaning change whereby input to that process is primarily constituted by normal                             
usage, permissible pragmatic operations on existing meanings, changes in the world, or speakers’                         
conceptions of the world. Processes of meaning change that are driven by linguistic intervention, by                             
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contrast, have as a crucial part of their input strategic, intentional or project-like plans on the part of                                   
speakers to change which word-meaning pairs are in circulation. Such speakers have a ​metalinguistic                           
standpoint – a set of beliefs about what word-meaning pairs should be in circulation amongst their                               
linguistic community, and their linguistic activities are in part guided and influenced by that                           
metalinguistic standpoint. They imagine that if our language were like this, then our language would                             
be better or the world would be better off. Their intentions and metalinguistic stand-point can affect                               
their linguistic activity, and hence, the semantic and pragmatic properties of their speech.  
 
Linguistic interventions are similar to, but also importantly different from, other communicative                       
exchanges discussed in the literature, most notably metalinguistic negotiations. Consider the following                       
example of a metalinguistic negotiation from David Plunkett and Tim Sundell (2013: 14-5). We’re                           
making chili for dinner. You see me chopping up several more scotch bonnets to add to the already                                   
pepper-filled chili. You say that you don’t like things too spicy, and I ask what counts as spicy. You                                     
taste the chili, turn red, and say ‘​That​ is spicy’. I taste it and say: ‘You wuss, that’s not spicy’. 
What’s going on here, arguably, is a disagreement about how to use the word ‘spicy’: that is, a                                   
metalinguistic negotiation, one about words. In answering my question, you are conveying that that                           
chili ​should fall under the extension of ‘spicy’. In responding, I’m denying that it should. What we’re                                 
doing is negotiating about how precisely to use the word ‘spicy’ in this and future culinary                               
endeavours. In what follows let’s use metalinguistic negotiation to refer to metalinguistic                       
disagreements which have this normative component (by contrast, we’ll say a ​metalinguistic use need                           
not have this normative component. If we’re in the zoo and I see a sign saying ‘Pachyderms to the                                     
left’, I might ask you what pachyderms are and you might say, pointing to a big elephant, ‘​that is a                                       
pachyderm’. You thereby say something, at least in part, about the word ‘pachyderm’, namely that that                               
elephant falls under its extenstion, and so your use is metalinguistic, but it’s not a normative claim                                 
about how we should use ‘pachyderm’ for our conversational purposes. See Ludlow 2014a: 13-4, and                             
Plunkett and Sundell 2013:14 for more on metalinguistic use.) 
 
As I understand Peter Ludlow (2014a,b), and Plunkett and Sundell (2013), metalinguistic negotiations                           
are limited in their scope – the aim of the negotiation is to settle what a given word should mean ​in the                                           
context of a given communicative exchange​. Speakers in metalinguistic negotiations needn’t have                       
diachronic intentions to change the meaning for the linguistic community as a whole, in (all                             
foreseeable) future contexts. Linguistic interventions, by contrast, have this much more ambitious                       
goal. The linguistic properties of metalinguistic negotiations and linguistic interventions differ, then, in                         
that negotiations are attempts for the target word ​w to mean ​A ​in context c ​(or some suitably limited set                                       
of contexts C​), whereas interventions are attempts for the target word ​w to mean ​A sans phrase​. The                                   
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semantic, pragmatic and metasemantic properties of the respective utterances differ and the two differ                           
in how they are the input to processes of linguistic change. Metalinguistic negotiations are input in the                                 
process of meaning change by altering use-facts, resolving underdetermination or changing speakers’                       
conceptions. Linguistic inventions, by contrast, are attempts to introduce a new meaning or eliminate                           
an old one – to anchor a new word-meaning pair or derail an old one.  
 
Amelioration and Facilitating Meaning Change by Use 
 
As a hypothetical example of linguistic intervention, consider Sally Haslanger’s ameliorative analysis                       
of the concept ‘woman’:  
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S is a ‘woman’ iff  
(i) S is regularly and for the most part observed or imagined to have certain bodily features                               
presumed to be evidence of a female’s biological role in reproduction;  
(ii) that S has these features marks S within the dominant ideology of S’s society as someone who                                 
ought to occupy certain kinds of social position that are in fact subordinate (and so motivates                               
and justifies S’s occupying such a position!); and  
(iii) the fact that S satisfies i and ii plays a role in S’s systematic subordination, i.e., along some                                   
dimension, S’s social position is oppressive, and S’s satisfying i and ii plays a role in that                                 
dimension of subordination. (2000, p. 42)  
 
Call the meaning of ​woman that corresponds to this ameliorative analysis ​A​. For my purposes, nothing                               
hangs on the specifics of the analysis – what does matter is that the analysis offers a significantly                                   
different meaning than that currently in circulation. One way to put this is to say that the conventional                                   
meaning of the term ​woman is significantly different, perhaps incommensurable with, the proposed                         
ameliorated meaning for ​woman​.  
 
Now, imagine a speaker with the metalinguistic standpoint that the word ​woman should mean ​A​, and                               
who engages in linguistic activity, at least some of the time, whereby they use the word ​woman in a                                     
way so as to facilitate meaning change. The ameliorator might do various things to facilitate meaning                               
change. She might, for example: (i) assert or propose that ​woman should mean ​A ​in hopes of changing                                   
people’s conceptions or use; (ii) explicitly mark her speech or make her intentions manifest – that she                                 
means ​A by ​woman or (iii) metalinguistically negotiate, and thereby potentially change some                         
metasemantic determinants of the meaning of woman (e.g., the use facts); or (iv) she might make a                                 
word-meaning pair taboo by attempting to invoke worldly consequences for its use (see Anderson and                             
Lepore 2013). I won’t focus on these sorts of linguistic activities.  
 
4 I add a proviso here that Haslanger would not necessarily endorse any claims that I make by way of using this example.  
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Rather, I want to focus on linguistic activities on the part of the ameliorator whereby she uses ​woman                                   
as if the word means ​A​, and/or interprets others’ uses of ​woman ​as if the word means ​A​. In particular,                                       
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I will focus on cases whereby the ameliorator treats ​woman as meaning A even though she doesn’t                                 
believe that ​women means A. I want to focus especially on cases where the ameliorator’s interlocutor                               
is not (fully) aware that she is speaking/interpreting in this way. This might be so because the                                 
ameliorator’s intentions were not manifest to her audience, or because her interlocutor isn’t                         
sufficiently aware of her project and metalinguistic standpoint. Linguistic activities of this sort I                           
understand as an interesting and important form of linguistic intervention. 
 
One might judge such linguistic activity with suspicion. Why use ​woman as if it means something it                                 
doesn’t, when you’re aware your audience has little chance of understanding what you are saying?                             
Why purposely misunderstand what someone is saying to you? Despite the apparent unreasonableness                         
of this sort of linguistic engagement, I think there is a way to make sense of it, and I think it is more                                             
common than one might initially have thought. In the case of introduction and change, it is an attempt                                   
to anchor a new word-meaning pair – to homophonically baptize – by way of metalinguistic use                               
–​ ​while, simultaneously, attempting to render defective the interpretive common ground of the original                         
word-meaning pair (cf. Barker (2002), Krifka (2013), Richard (ms)). In the case of elimination, it is an                                 
attempt to break the communicative chain (Kripke 1980) or dominance facts (Evans 1973) that                           
connect speakers to the problematic anchoring event, again while simultaneously rendering defective                       
the interpretive common ground. 
 
Linguistic Disruption  
 
One important and distinctive thing about this kind of linguistic activity is that it is ​disruptive​.                               
Linguistic interventions are disruptive in at least two senses. First, linguistic interventions of this sort                             
are a disruptive form of communication. The ameliorator’s linguistic activity attempts to disrupt the                           
interpretive common ground so as to affect metalinguistic reflection and reconstruction on the part of                             
her interlocutor – it attempts to disrupt the interpretive resources of the interlocutor so that they engage                                 
in imaginative and counterfactual thought about language and its potential role in the world. Second,                             
linguistic interventions disrupt the normal functioning of the language system. Rachel Ann McKinney                         
(2015), amongst others, Many theorists think of our language system as serving certain functions and                             
that a well-functioning language system has value insofar as it serves those functions -- as Rachel Ann                                 
McKinney (2015) nicely puts it: a well-functioning language system allows us “to learn from each                             
other, to inquire and deliberate together, to pool information, to coordinate action, express care and                             
5 ​See Thomasson 2016 for a view on which much of metaphysicians’ talk should be understood in this way: the nihilist about 
composition, for example, uses ​table ​ ​as if ​ it has no meaning (or at least an empty extension). 
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concern, to reflect on and solve common problems, and so on.” (2015: 54) What such linguistic                               
interventions do or aim to do is to disrupt the functions of the language system, so as to effect change. 
 
In what follows, I will make a case for the claim that this kind of linguistic activity is in fact as normal                                           
and perhaps even as pervasive as other forms of linguistic activity that are disruptive – for example,                                 
lying. I will also argue that it is reasonable, from a theoretical perspective, to construe such activity as                                   
part of the normal maintenance of our language system, and perhaps even the (social) world more                               
broadly. Such an observation is significant, as it ultimately makes acts of linguistic intervention easier                             
to justify.  
 
On the other hand, despite any social, practical and intellectual benefits such changes might potentially                             
achieve, such changes are by no means always easy to bring about, if they can be brought about at all.                                       
(In sections 3 and 4, I outline complications which ultimately make acts of linguistic intervention                             
harder to justify.)  
 
Some authors have already noted that meaning shifts seem hard to achieve (Burgess and Plunkett                             
2013a, Cappelen 2018). For example, if one endorses semantic externalism, then speakers can’t                         
always simply change what their words mean, neither by individual nor collective will. Many of the                               
metasemantic facts that fix the meanings of our expressions are simply outside of our control. To give                                 
an incomplete but illustrative list, none of the following can be said to be in full control of any given                                       
speaker or even community of speakers: naturalness and magnetism (Lewis 1983, 1984; a recent                           
exhaustive discussion is Dorr and Hawthorne 2013), patterns of past usage or future usage                           
(Williamson 1994, Jackman 1999), linguistic conventions (Lewis 1969), features of the event where                         
the meaning was introduced (Putnam 1975, Burge 1979), causal chains or dominant sources (Evans                           
1973, Kripke 1980), speaker intentions (Kaplan 1989, Stokke 2012, King 2014), some even argue                           
modal facts (see Cappelen and Dever 2018: 92ff) and normative facts (Haslanger 2012; see Cappelen                             
2018 p79 for discussion) about usage. Endorsing semantic internalism won’t do us any better either                             
(Cappelen 2018 p91; ​pace ​Burgess and Plunkett 2013a p.1096). This makes acts of linguistic                           
intervention difficult to justify because it simply seems like there is no way for us to fruitfully control                                   
the relevant metasemantic facts. 
 
Linguistic Transgression and the Linguistic Reformer’s Dilemma 
 
I won’t focus on the above-mentioned set of difficulties; instead I will focus on another worry. The                                 
worry centers on the fact that some acts of linguistic intervention involve what we might call ​linguistic                                 
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transgression​. The issue can be usefully illustrated by considering what is known as the Reformer’s                             
Dilemma (REF). Suppose for the sake of illustration that semantic conventionalism is true – that is,                               
that what our words mean is tightly constrained by the linguistic conventions of the relevant                             
community of speakers. The ​Linguistic Reformer’s Dilemma is as follows: Suppose speaker ​S ​is a                             
linguistic reformer and thinks that word ​w should mean ​A where ​A is not the meaning determined by                                   
the linguistic conventions of ​S​’s community. If ​S uses ​w to mean ​A – i.e., speaks to and interprets                                     
others as if ​w means ​A – then ​S has done something wrong qua member of his linguistic community                                     
(supposing ordinary, non-figurative use). Either ​S can speak and interpret others correctly (according                         
to conventional meaning) or ​S can reform the language, but ​S can’t do both. Thus, an act of attempted                                     
reform of this sort will involve a fault on the part of speaker – a linguistic transgression. 
 
I think there is a way out for the linguistic reformer – the reformer can overcome the challenge                                   
linguistic transgression poses for her realizing her aim of linguistic reform. Later, I argue that an                               
important strategy for linguistic reformers is to engage in linguistic transgressions because these elicit                           
transformative communicative disruptions​. In such cases, the interventionist’s transgression is justified                     
(they are outweighed by the potential benefits to be achieved – either representational or worldly), and                               
she is engaging in activity whereby her interlocutor can reflect on the meaning of the given word,                                 
acquire the new meaning and recognize the new meaning as an improvement. Sometimes being a good                               
member of a linguistic community will involve disrupting and transgressing: The reasons for having                           
the linguistic system in the first place can give us reason to flout individual conventions and norms of                                   
that system.   
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Section 2: On the Pervasiveness of Linguistic Interventions 
 
Generally, word-meaning pairs only come into circulation when two things have happened (at least on                             
some prominent theories):  
 
(I1) something like an ​anchoring or ​baptism event (Kripke 1980) has occurred whereby a speaker                             
performs a dubbing and the word becomes connected with a referent, and;  
 
6 ​Let me ward off some obvious objections: It is worth mentioning that I am supposing as preconditions to 
engagement in this kind of linguistic activity that the reformer has good reason to believe that: (i) her project has 
a fair chance at success; and (ii) her speech does not pose a detrimental threat to the functioning of the language 
system. 
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(I2) some process of spread has occurred whereby the word-meaning pair is brought into circulation                             
amongst the community of speakers.  
 
Kripke and subsequent literature discuss introductions by means of explicit metalinguistic discourse                       
involving deixis and description (e.g., his ​Feynman ​and his ​Jack the Ripper cases (see Kripke 1980)).                               
But there are other options: One might argue that speakers can anchor a new word-meaning pair by                                 
way of metalinguistic use, and in particular, a metalinguistic use with an ameliorator’s scope and                             
ambitions. In such a case, the word-meaning pair is introduced by way of linguistic intervention of the                                 
7
sort outlined above. 
 
If a word-meaning pair is to be genuinely replaced by a new word-meaning pair, more than (I1) and                                   
(I2) needs to have taken place – (I3) needs to have taken place as well:  
 
(I3) a process of elimination has occurred whereby the original word-meaning pair is eliminated from                             
circulation amongst the community of speakers.  
 
A word-meaning pair might disappear from circulation by simply becoming obsolete, but it can also                             
disappear with the help of linguistic intervention. An example of such an intervention is discussed                             
below (see section 2). In these cases, the interventionist is attempting to eliminate the word-meaning                             
pair from circulation by breaking the communicative chain that connects the linguistic community to                           
the anchoring event of the original word-meaning pair. 
 
To see that linguistic interventions are as pervasive and normal as other forms of linguistic activity that                                 
disrupt the normal functioning of the language system, like lying, consider the following collection of                             
phenomena, which are now part of or could easily be considered part of descriptive, empirical projects                               
in linguistics and philosophy of language. One example we already considered above – that of                             
ambitious metalinguistic negotiations without strict limitations of contextual scope. I consider five                       
more examples in turn: (i) neologisms, protologisms and semantic introductions, (ii) the                       
reappropriation of slurs and insults, (iii) transgressive uses of definitional or normative generics, (iv)                           
semantic elimination and interpretive uncharity, and (v) blocking and flouting (semantic)                     
presuppositions.  
 
(i)​ ​Neologisms, protologisms and semantic introductions 
 
7 For some work on this see the discussion in Armstrong (2016) on lexical innovation. 
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Words-meaning pairs where (I1) has taken place, but where the process in (I2) is incomplete are called                                 
neologisms ​or protologisms​. An example from the feminist movement in the 1970s is ​womyn’s                           
herstory​. Examples abound in the age of social media: ​hangry, tweet cred and #​X​, for any ​X​. As an                                     
example of semantic introduction consider the slang word, ​cool​. ​Cool had a meaning before its slang                               
use, and arguably its slang use is related in some way to its original meaning. In this case, a speaker                                       
introduced a new meaning homophonically by introducing an ambiguity or polysemy, and it spread                           
and acquired a meaning. ​Other examples include: the introduction of ​administrative assistant to                         
replace ​secretary​, the introduction of ​firefighter to replace ​fireman​, the introduction of ​server to                           
replace ​waitress​. 
 
(ii) Reappropriation of slurs or insults 
 
Consider the reappropriated slur, ​bitch​. This can be seen a further example of linguistic intervention.                             
In its original use the term had an oppressive, insulting meaning, but once it was reclaimed the term                                   
was used in an acceptable, non-oppressive and often even a positive manner. Initially, the term was                               
used within a local community of users that included the reappropriators, but later it was also                               
understood as such by the larger linguistic community.  
 
The reappropriators of the term ​bitch, during the period of trying to reappropriate the term, proposed                               
and tried to get others to accept a revised meaning for the existing slur. In doing so, we can suppose,                                       
reappropriators used the word ​bitch​. In particular, reappropriators might have used the term when it                             
had its conventional meaning, though they used it as if it had its reappropriated meaning.  
 
(iii) Transgressive uses of normative or definitional generics  
 
Consider the following examples of normative or definitional generics (Krifka 2013, Leslie 2015,                         
Cohen 2001, Haslanger 2007): 
(2)  a. Girls are tough. 
b.  Crop tops are cute. 
 
One prominent view of definitional or normative generics treats them as metalinguistic claims 
involving a metalinguistic use. For example, (2a), makes a statement about the meaning of the term 
girls​ and how it should be used:  
(3)  The term ​girls​ should be used so that it applies to things that are tough.  
 
10 
But (3) doesn’t merely say something about the linguistic expression ​girls​, it also advocates for a 
particular meaning the speaker endorses, regardless of whether “toughness” is part of the conventional 
meaning. In addition, in so advocating, the speaker uses the term ​girls​ to express their endorsement of 
a definition or descriptive generalization involving the existing linguistic expression.  
 
(iv) Interpretive uncharity and semantic elimination  
 
Consider the following communicative scenario involving an ameliorator of the term ​woman​: 
 
Suppose that Ben is walking with a friend in a park. He says, of his small, female child, ‘I hope she grows up to                                               
be a strong and powerful woman’. The ameliorator follows through with her commitment to her project,                               
and understands Ben to hope that his small child will grow up to be strong, powerful, and subordinated                                   
on the basis of the reproductive organs she is perceived to have. The ameliorator thus responds, ‘That’s                                 
perverse. Why would you want your child to be unjustly subordinated?’ Further, if Ben does not take                                 
his assertion back, the ameliorator then reports what he said to others, saying that he wants his own                                   
child to be subordinated on the basis of the reproductive organs she is perceived to have.   8
 
That might seem a bit artificial. But real life examples aren’t hard to find. Thus consider: 
 
In the autism community, there's a debate about the correct terminology to use to discuss autistic people. There's                                     
a push for using 'autistic person' as opposed to 'person with autism' because, it's argued, the former                                 
phrase better reflects the centrality to the person's identity of autism. Autism, the thought goes, is not                                 
something incidental to a person and language should reflect this. Now imagine Ben’s friend is                             9
someone who agrees with this perspective, and so thinks 'person with autism' is not the right way to                                   
refer to autistic people, because to be a person with autism is to be someone for whom autism is a                                       
merely incidental feature of their identity, and there are no such people. And imagine Ben has just                                 
learned his daughter is autistic, but Ben doesn't know about the linguistic debate. He says "Children                               
with autism grow up to be adults with autism, so I've already got used to the thought that my daughter                                       
will face some challenges as an adult." Sarah replies, uncharitably, "What? You think autism is just an                                 
accidental feature of people? That's weird. I would have thought you would have known better." 
 
This kind of communicative deviance is perhaps more involved, and harder to justify, but it can also                                 
be effective at eliminating word-meaning pairs from circulation. If the ameliorator engages in this sort                             
of linguistic activity, as a hearer, her interlocutors will tend to stop using the word ​woman with its                                   
non-ameliorated meaning, or stop using ​person with autism​ completely. 
 
(v) Blocking or flouting (semantic) presuppositions 
 
When babies started sporting onesies with ​I love my mommies! printed on them, these uses of ​my                                 
10
mommies were meant to provoke the idea that ​my mommies can mean ​my parents​. It’s not far off to                                     
think that this intervention was intended to induce a permanent shift in the (semantic) presuppositions                             
associated with ​my mommies​. One might imagine that attempts to use ​my mommies in the ameliorated                               
8 Thanks to Jack Spencer for this example. 
9 ​See, for example: ​http://autisticadvocacy.org/about-asan/identity-first-language/ ​. Thanks to Matthew McKeever for this 
example. 
10 Thanks to Joshua Armstrong and Samia Hesni for this example. 
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sense before the intervention resulted in presupposition failure or were met with the reaction that the                               
speaker was confused, whereas after the intervention ​my mommies could be used unproblematically to                           
refer to two (or more) women as a parental unit. In this example, the ameliorator in producing the                                   
onesie was likely motivated, in part, by the belief that ​my mommies should have an unproblematic                               
lexical meaning in such circumstances. One way of understanding the example, then, is to think of the                                 
onesie intervention as a strategic and intentional attempt to change the (semantic) presuppositions of                           
my mommies​. 
 
The important point is this: All of the above linguistic activity seem like things speakers are regularly                                 
and extensively engaged in, despite its transgressive and disruptive nature. Like lying, linguistic                         
interventions are a normal and regular form of linguistic engagement, with complex and interesting                           
social and moral implications. 
 
 
Section 3: Challenges for the Ameliorator I - Transition         
Periods and the Inevitability of Miscommunication  
 
In Evans’s ​The Causal Theory of Names​, he describes a case of reference shift which is illustrative: 
 
A youth A leaves a small village in the Scottish highlands to seek his fortune having acquired the 
nickname Turnip. ... Fifty or so years later a man B comes to the village and lives as a hermit 
over the hill. The three or four villagers surviving from the time of the youth’s departure 
believe falsely that this is the long-departed villager returned. Consequently, they use the 
name Turnip among themselves and it gets into wider circulation among the younger villagers 
who have no idea how it originated. I am assuming that the older villagers, if the facts were 
pointed out, would say It isn’t Turnip after all rather than It appears after all that Turnip did 
not come from this village. In that case I should say that they use the name to refer to A, and 
in fact, denoting him, say false things about him (even by uttering ​Here is Turnip coming to 
get his coffee again​).  
 
But they may die off, leaving a homogeneous community using the name to refer to the man over the 
hill. I should say the way is clear to its becoming his name. The story is not much affected if 
the older villagers pass on some information whose source is A by saying such things as 
Turnip was quite a one for the girls, for the younger villagers’ clusters would still be 
dominantly of the man over the hill. But it is an important feature of my account that the 
information that the older villagers gave the younger villagers could be so rich, coherent, and 
important to them that A could be the dominant source of their information, so that they too 
would acknowledge That man over the hill isn’t Turnip after all.  (1973, 23) 
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In Evans’s ​Turnip case, there is a period where reference shift has not yet occurred and the villagers                                   
end up saying false things about the initial referent. There is also a period where the older villagers die                                     
off and the young ones establish a new “dominant source” for the name ​Turnip​. Before the dominant                                 
source is established, however, the young villagers say meaningless things since there is no established                             
referent for the term during that period. It should be clear that both periods, during transition from one                                   
meaning of a term ​w to a new one, are extremely important for anyone engaged in a project of                                     
linguistic reform.  
Call a ​transition period the period during a project of linguistic revision before meaning change is                               
successful. During the transition period, there will be many uses of ​w by the interventionist (and her                                 
local speech community) where meaning change has not yet occurred. These uses are important to the                               
success of their project, so it is important to understand what the semantic and communicative                             
properties of these uses of ​w​. As Evans observes, such uses will sometimes be false or nonsensical,                                 
and hence semantically or communicatively ​deviant in some way. This presents a challenge to the                             
linguistic interventionist: attempts to introduce and use ​w ​with the desired new meaning will result in                               
linguistic transgressions in the form of false and meaningless speech. 
 
Jennifer Saul (2006) makes similar observations in raising concerns for Haslanger’s ameliorative                       
analyses of gender, claiming that ameliorative projects have the strange consequence that an                         
ameliorator’s speech inevitably leads to misunderstandings and confusion:  
Imagine that Amanda takes a feminist philosophy class and is convinced by Haslanger’s views. She 
decides to use the terms woman and man in the way that Haslanger suggests in order to 
explain to her friend Beau what she has learned. Amanda utters (1):  
 
(1) All women are subordinated by men.  
 
Beau does not use woman and man in the way that Amanda uses these terms. He uses them, let’s say, 
as sex terms. A first question is what Amanda has said. Since the speaker and audience have 
different meanings in mind ... it is genuinely unclear what the right answer is. Possibly, the 
right answer is that Amanda has failed to say anything. This seems strange. Perhaps more 
plausibly, Amanda has said one thing and Beau has understood her as saying another. ... These 
difficulties ... point to the seriousness of the confusion that is possible with a contextualist 
version of Haslanger’s view. In so doing, they offer some reason for resisting it. (2006)  
This case again shows that the linguistic interventionist, in attempting to introduce and use ​w with an                                 
improved meaning, will result in linguistic transgression by causing misunderstandings and confusion.  
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The extent of the misunderstanding and confusion that the linguistic interventionist can cause is even                             
worse than it seems from these two examples. The false or meaningless beliefs, misunderstandings and                             
confusion can be spread throughout the community of speakers by way of (i) misattribution in speech                               
and thought reports and (ii) failed testimonial chains. I consider examples of each in turn. 
 
Consider again Saul’s ameliorator Amanda from the above quoted example. Direct assertions won’t be                           
the only utterances involving ​woman that Amanda will make. Imagine Donald Trump uttering ​she is                             
not socially subordinated (pointing at his daughter Ivanka). Amanda can report what Donald Trump                           
said using ​woman​, by saying: 
 
(2) Donald Trump said that Ivanka is not a woman.  
 
Supposing that ​woman is used as a sex term in Amanda’s linguistic community, in uttering (2),                               
Amanda says to her hearer that Donald Trump said that Ivanka is not female. Thus, saying what others                                   
say and think while using their words becomes difficult for the linguistic interventionist. 
 
Another type of example is what are called ​failed testimonial chains​: Amanda says ​women are F and                                 
another speaker, Eliot, is told that Amanda says that women are F. Eliot trusts Amanda, and passes this                                   
along to others, but Eliot is unaware of the ameliorated meaning. Here we have miscommunication                             
spreading false or defective beliefs via failed testimony. 
 
This presents a challenge to the linguistic interventionist as it seems that any attempt at intervention                               
will lead to various kinds of defective communication and linguistic transgression. Hence, there is a                             
precise sense in which the ameliorator’s speech disrupts her linguistic engagements and undermines                         
the functioning of the language system.  
 
Section 4: Challenges for the Ameliorator II - From         
Miscommunication to Lying, Misleading and Bullshitting 
 
So far this might all look like an argument to the effect that meaning transitions will lead to false or                                       
defective beliefs and miscommunication. But does the inevitability of miscommunication entail the                       
inevitably of more serious forms of deviant speech and transgression? On the one hand,                           
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interventionists are merely attempting to introduce new word-meaning pairs into circulation. On the                         
other hand, they may know their speech will lead to disruption, miscommunication and confusion. 
 
Let us distinguish some phenomena:  
 
Uncooperative Speech: Speaker and audience do not have common conversational goals and do not                           
share the relevant mutual attitudes. 
 
Lying:  A speaker lies iff:  
i. They say that q; 
ii. They believe q to be false;  
iii. They intend the hearer to believe that q is true. (Mahon 2015) 
 
Misleading:​ A speaker misleads iff:  
i. They communicate that q;  
ii. They believe q to be false;  
iii. They intend the hearer to believe that q is true. (Mahon 2015) 
 
Bull-shitting: Speakers who say things without caring whether what they say is true or false.                             
(Frankfurt 2005) 
These analyses are not the state-of-the-art in the literature on insincere speech. However, they have the                               
benefit of being straightforward and relatively good reference points for connecting to the                         
state-of-the-art should one be inclined towards a particular analysis (e.g., Fallis 2009, Stokke 2013).                           
Let us see then if our examples of interventionist speech are in a position to satisfy these definitions.  
 
It seems obvious that the kind of interventionist speech of interest counts as uncooperative – she                               
clearly has different conversational goals from her interlocutor. Let’s take a more difficult case. The                             
least obvious case is whether the interventionist counts as lying. Consider whether the ameliorator                           
Amanda counts as lying given the criteria (i) to (iii) in our definition of lying stated above. To fix                                     
examples, consider Amanda who utters to her friend Beau ​We need to get rid of women​. In Amanda’s                                   
mouth, she is saying that we need to get rid of subordination on the basis of perceived female                                   
biological features. However, even if Amanda wants the meaning of ​woman ​to be ​A​, it often cannot be                                   
because her hearers will not recognize her intention or recover her intended meaning. Beau will                             
understand her as saying that we need to get rid of females (or some pragmatically modulated version                                 
of this).  
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 In this example, Amanda’s speech says that we need to get rid of females. Moreover, she knows that                                   
this is what the sentence ​We need to get rid of women says​, and she knows that this is false. Thus,                                         
Amanda’s speech satisfies (i) and (ii) in the definition of lying above. What about criteria (iii)? Does                                 
Amanda intend for her hearers to believe that we need to get rid of females (is true)? This last criteria                                       
is tricky: Amanda certainly intends that her audience believe that it’s true that we need to get rid of                                     
subordination. But she didn’t succeed in communicating this content and knew at the time of speaking                               
that she wouldn’t succeed. Is Amanda’s belief that her audience would pick up the literal content and                                 
believe it enough to count as intending her audience to believe it?  
 
Even if my reader isn’t convinced of this, I will argue that this intention is actually crucial for the                                     
success of the interventionist project. In the next section, I will outline why this is so. 
 
Before that, however, it is worth noting that some of the interventionist’s speech more easily qualifies                               
as misleading or bullshitting. In the case of misleading, the ameliorator need only communicate                           
something false and in the case of bullshitting, she need only show indifference towards the truth of                                 
what she says or communicates. 
 
Section 5: Effective Linguistic Interventions - Transformative       
Communicative Disruptions 
 
Ameliorators, given the right motivations, can use deviant communication – like miscommunication,                       
uncooperative or insincere speech – to accomplish their projects of linguistic change. The disruption                           
of standard communicative patterns can help them accomplish their goals. The disruptions are a good                             
thing as they can have the effect of making the hearer stop and reflect on their usage, and this                                     
reflection can be ​transformative​. In other words, the deviant communicative activity of the                         
ameliorator can engage the hearer in the sort of metalinguistic reflection needed to acquire the new                               
meaning and understand the ameliorator’s utterances as she intends. In addition, it can engage the                             
hearer in reflection about the representational and worldly consequences of their speech, and how a                             
change in word-meaning pair may help bring about representational and worldly benefits. 
 
Return to the example involving Amanda’s utterance of ​We need to get rid of women​. Consider                               
someone not initiated in or not knowing about Amanda’s project who is told that her goal is to get rid                                       
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of women. On the supposed conventional reading, this is horrific. That reaction of horror, which is a                                 
result of the miscommunication and maybe even an intended one, is constructive. It makes the                             
audience stop and think, and that thinking will trigger further communicative efforts on the part of the                                 
hearer. It will lead her, one might hope, to start reflecting on the meaning of her words, and that                                     
process itself is part of the goal of the project of linguistic intervention.  
 
Here is a further example of how a false or defective belief can trigger reflection of this sort: Imagine a                                       
reappropriator, Mia, who says ​Samantha is a bitch and miscommunicates that Samantha is bossy, etc.                             
Her audience will be shocked, as Mia is normally such a nice person and knows what it’s like to be                                       
called a bitch. This cognitive dissonance, Mia’s kindness on the one hand and her use of the term ​bitch                                     
on the other, can make them reflect on their usage, and their grasp of the meaning of ​bitch could                                     
undergo a transformation.  
 
Similarly, in the cases of the uncharitable interpreter and the onesie-interventionist that flouted the                           
(semantic) presuppositions of ​my mommies​. Each of their communicative transgressions results in the                         
kind of reflection that can be transformative. 
 
So far, these are transformations that occur in individual communicative exchanges, involving                       
individual speakers. Such exchanges might only have minimal effect on achieving meaning                       
transformation. However, individual transformations can eventually spread across the linguistic                   
population and lead to full meaning transformation. Once this has occurred, the project of linguistic                             
intervention is successful.  
 
Disruptiveness is not sufficient for meaning transformation. In meaning transformation, coming to                       
understand the proposed amelioration is transformative. The deviant communicative event, together                     
with a number of other events, triggers a full-on meaning change that is transformative. Meaning                             
changes are transformative when they enable the interpreter to think and communicate things she                           
could not have thought or said without having that meaning – having that meaning gives the interpreter                                 
new abilities to imagine, recognize, create cognitive models, and communicate using that meaning.                         
The change offers a new way of understanding the world, and results in substantially revised                             
normative commitments and core preferences. Think about each of the cases we have considered so far                               
and how the new meanings result in discontinuous, revised understandings of the world and of the                               
kinds of normative commitments and preferences one has. Amanda understands woman as unduly                         
subordinated and now wants to take action. The reappropriator recognizes that she shouldn’t ever be                             
called a bitch (in the old sense) and that taking control of the term disempowers those that would. The                                     
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onesie intervention allowed for a new understanding of who counts as parents, and people’s normative                             
commitments and preferences surrounding parenthood change.  
 
So far, I have discussed meaning transformation, and events that trigger meaning transformations.                         
There are not yet transformative experiences in L.A. Paul’s sense (2015a). But I think there are some                                 
close analogies. The first is that authors in the literature on amelioration and conceptual improvement                             
sometimes think of conceptual change analogously to how Paul thinks of transformative experiences.                         
Paul (2015b: 761) describes a transformative experience as “an experience that is both epistemically                           
and personally transformative” where an experience is ​epistemically ​transformative when it “teaches                       
you something you could not have learned without having that kind of experience. Having that                             
experience gives you new abilities to imagine, recognize, and cognitively model possible future                         
experiences of that kind” and where an experience is ​personally ​transformative when it “changes you                             
in some deep and personally fundamental way, for example, by changing your core personal                           
preferences or by changing the way you understand your desires, your defining intrinsic properties, or                             
your self-perspective.” The authors in the literature on amelioration and conceptual improvement also                         
observe something that might be classed as epistemically and personally transformative. Burgess and                         
Plunkett, for example, nicely summarize something that might be considered a transformation of our                           
concepts:  
 
Arguably, our conceptual repertoire determines not only what beliefs we can have but also what 
hypotheses we can entertain, what desires we can form, what plans we can make on the basis 
of such mental states, and accordingly constrains what we can hope to accomplish in the 
world. Representation enables action, from the most sophisticated scientific research, to the 
most mundane household task. It influences our options within social/political institutions and 
even helps determine which institutions are so much as thinkable. Our social roles, in turn, 
help determine what kinds of people we can be, what sorts of lives we can lead. Conceptual 
choices and changes may be intrinsically interesting, but the clearest reason to care about them 
is just that their non-conceptual consequences are pervasive and profound. (2013: 1096-7)  
 
But the meaning transformation discussed here might seem very different after all from transformative                           
experiences. Meaning transformation is a drawn-out event, consisting of innumerable small                     
interactions between speakers and audience members. However, I think this is also true of some of                               
Paul’s core cases – like becoming a doctor (Paul 2014, chapter 3): It’s not a single event, or if it is one                                           
event, then it’s one that is stretched out over time. Moreover, it is unclear to what extent meaning                                   
11
transformations are first-personally transformative for all speakers. These issues I leave as open                         
11 That said, it’s arguable that some such events are single and non-stretched out: seeing the mommie onesie 
could immediately make something about same sex partnerships click for someone who had previously, for 
example, not paid attention to the debates and news stories about the matter, causing them to fundamentally 
rethink the nature of parenthood. 
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questions. 
 
Section 6: Justifying Linguistic Interventions - The Long        
Game and Diachronic Communicative Intentions 
 
Some pressing concerns regarding the communicative strategy discussed have been raised. The                       
disruptions are risky communicative behavior. They won’t always work. The ameliorator intentionally                       
risks prolonged misleading or worse. It’s not always going to be the case that her audience can look                                 
back on the exchange and see that it was the improved meaning that was intended. Interventionists                               
even risk detrimentally undermining the functioning of the language system, or they may end up                             
silencing themselves – in a manner much like what McGowan (2013) calls ​sincerity silencing​. 
 
But it is important to note that even though Amanda, the reappropriator Mia, the uncharitable                             
interpreter and the onesie-interventionist used disruptions to contribute to their projects, they didn’t                         
have ill intentions in doing so. In this section, I outline how we might understand the communicative                                 
intentions of the ameliorator in a way that makes them unproblematic. 
 
In order to do so, let’s summarize the communicative situation I am characterizing: A utters S to B, A                                     
knows that in their public language S means that q. ​A doesn’t believe that q or is indifferent towards                                     
q, but A wants S to mean that p and wants this speech act to be part of the revisionary process. ​A                                           
intends for B to, at first, get the false or defective belief that q – then, somehow, that belief, in addition                                         
to a number of other events, will accomplish the revision. ​B can then think back on this                                 
communicative exchange and realize that it was p that was the ultimate communicative intention. B                             
can also gain the now true, intended belief that p. In this way, A and B were part of a transformative                                         
miscommunication.  
 
In characterizing the situation in this way, we see that the ameliorator is interested in the                               
communicative “long game”, not just what’s going on in their own communicative context, or with the                               
community of speakers that speak their shared language at the time of her utterance.  
 
She intends for her speech to eventually be understood as she wants it to be – i.e., with its ameliorated                                       
meaning. The ameliorator has ​diachronic communicative intentions – communicative intentions that                     
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are not relevant to her context, but project into future communicative contexts and future linguistic                             
communities.  
 
Diachronic communicative intentions might be more common than one might think, even                       
independently of the issues of amelioration and conceptual engineering discussed here. There are                         
circumstances when speaking in this way seems justified and appropriate. For instance, parents and                           
teachers often tell white lies to their children or students in order to aid their understanding of some                                   
difficult subject matter. They do so, knowing that the child (student) will eventually understand the                             
full complexity of the subject, and that some white lies acted as a stepping stone to that understanding.  
 
Conclusion 
 
Changing language, while necessary, is difficult. This paper has considered one important reason for              
its difficulty: it can often lead to miscommunication and confusion. I presented several ways we can                
use language which might lead to this sort of miscommunication and confusion. But then I argued that                 
these supposed problems can actually be beneficial. It's ​good that changing language leads to              
miscommunication and confusion, because that can cause speakers to reflect on their language, and              
that will lead them to focus on its flaws and ways to improve them. I called this process transformative                   
communicative disruption. The sort of reflection transformative communicative disruptions can bring           
about is the sort of thing anyone interested in changing language for the better should care about                 
fostering, and so we should embrace transformative communicative disruptions. 
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